COMMENTS AND NOTES
REMOVAL OF SUPREME COURT
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: A WEAPON
AGAINST OBSCENITY?
Despite various possible interpretations of the exceptions
and regulations clause, certain dicta by the Supreme Court
admit to plenary congressionalcontrol of the Court's appellate
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, Congress' reluctance to exercise
such power has prevented a direct holding which might take
cognizance of limitations on the power to eviscerate appellate
review. If passed into law, the recent Dirksen bill, limiting
Supreme Court jurisdiction to review both federal jury and
state court determinations of obscenity, may well precipitate
such a decision. This comment intends to explore the
limitations which may be placed upon congressional action
based on the exceptions and regulations clause, particularlyas
that action is related to the review the Court has exercised and
the tests it has sought to formulate to afford maximum first
amendmentprotection in the area of obscenity.

DURING

THE heated debates surrounding the attempted elevation
of Mr. Justice Fortas to the position of Chief Justice, Senator
Everett Dirksen introduced a bill' designed, in part, to blunt
charges that Fortas and the Supreme Court were "soft on
obscenity." 2 Dirksen's bill sought in the first instance to make the
determination of obscenity in federal trials primarily a question of
fact for the jury,3 whose decision no federal court would have

IS. 4058, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); see 114 CONG. REc. SII,000 (daily ed. Sept. 18,
1968).
2 N.Y. Times, Sept.
17, 1968, at 34, col. 3. The issue of obscenity was involved in the
Fortas debates due to testimony presented to the Senate Judiciary Committee by the Citizens
for Decent Literature. N.Y. Times, July 23, 1968, at 11, cols. 2-3. Dirksen, an early
supporter of Fortas, later dropped his support when Fortas' chances for elevation grew slim.
Newsweek, Oct. 7, 1968, at 42.
3S. 4058 would have added § 1466 to the federal obscenity statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461-

65. This new section entitled "Determinations of Fact" would have provided: "'Inevery
criminal action arising under this chapter or under any other statute of the United States
determination of the question whether any article, matter, thing, device, or substance is in
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jurisdiction "to review, reverse, or set aside," 4 and secondly, to
remove federal court jurisdiction "to review, reverse, or set aside"
state court determinations on the issue of obscenity.5 Although this
effort to curb the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court'
failed to reach the floor of the Senate, similar proposals will almost
certainly come before Congress in the future.7 The ramifications of
such proposals touch on far more than the "flood of filth"
supposedly inundating our nation. Thus it is the purpose of this
comment to explore the possibility of congressional removal of the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in general, as well as its
appellate review of obscenity cases in particular.
fact obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, vile, or filthy shall be made by the jury, without
comment by the court upon the weight of the evidence relevant to that question, unless the
,defendant has waived trial by jury."
IThe bill proposed amending 28 U.S.C. by the addition of chapter 176 entitled "Actions
Involving Obscenity," including § 3001(a) entitled "Judicial Review" which would read:
"(a) In any criminal action under any statute of the United States for the prosecution of any
person for the possession, sale, dissemination, or use of any obscene, lewd, lascivious,
indecent, vile, or filthy article, matter, thing, device, or substance, no court of the United
States or of the District of Columbia shall have jurisdiction to review, reverse, or set aside a
determination made by a jury on the question whether such article, matter, thing, device, or
substance is in fact obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, vile, or filthy."
I The bill further proposed amending 28 U.S.C. by the addition of § 3001(b) which would
read: "(b) In any criminal action arising under any statute of any State or under any law of
any political subdivision of any State for the prosecution of any person for the possession,
sale, dissemination, or use of any obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, vile, or filthy article,
matter, thiig, device, or substance, no court of the United State [sic] shall have jurisdiction
to review, reverse, or set aside "adetermination made by a court of such State on the questi6n
whether such article, matter, thing, device, or substance is in fact obscene, lewd, lascivious,
indecent, vile, or filthy." Although phrased to remove the jurisdiction of all federal courts to
review the findings of state courts, it is clear that in all but habeas corpus reviews, the
Supreme Court is the federal court primarily affected.
6Although S. 4058 purported to remove the jurisdiction of all federal courts, the scope of
this comment is limited to the denial of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Not only was the
Supreme Court the primary federal court upon whom congressional attention was focused at
the introduction of the bill, see notes 2 & 5 supra, but the congressional power to establish
inferior federal courts, U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § i, would appear at least to assure more
congressional power to manipulate the jurisdiction of lower federal courts than that of the
constitutionally-based Supreme Court. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-49
(1850). See also, e.g., Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-115
(1964) (restricting the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue injunctions in "labor disputes"
and from enforcing "yellow dog" contracts). Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323
(1938), upheld this provision.
7A letter to the. Duke Law Journal from Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., dated September 24,
1968, indicated that Senator Dirksen would reintroduce his bill during the following session
of Congress. The device of achieving political ends by procedural means, in particular by the
removal of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, has been recently attempted in several
other fields. See note 12 infra.
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Article III of the Constitution provides only a skeletal
framework for the federal judiciary, but it begins by assuring that
"[the judicial power shall be vested in one supreme Court. ' 8 By
subsequent provision, this judicial power is broadly defined to
include "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority ....
,,9The
Constitution further adumbrates the manner in which this judicial
power will be exercised by providing for a small segment of cases in
which the Court has original jurisdiction, 0 with the residue of
judicial power to be exercised as "appellate Jurisdiction, both as to
Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations
as the Congress shall make." It is upon this latter provision that
bills 12 such as Dirksen's. recent proposal have been based.
Nevertheless, the meaning of this clause has yet to be defined to the
satisfaction of many constitutional scholars, 3 and a precise
understanding of Congress' power over the exercise of appellate
'U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 1, cl.1.
Ild.§ 2, cl. 1.
Id. cl.2 provides: "lit all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 'Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction ....
"Id.
12E.g., S. 1194, 90th Cong., IstSess. (1968) (Senator Ervin) (sought withdrawal of
appellate jurisdiction in order to reinstate voluntariness as the test to determine admissibility
of a criminal confession); H.R. 11,926, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) (Congressman Tuck)
(sought to withdraw appellate jurisdiction in reapportionment cases); S. 2646, 85th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1957) (Senator Jenner) (sought to remove appellate jurisdiction to review practices
by congressional committees, practices by executive agencies dealing with subversion among
employees in the executive branch, state and school board efforts to deal with subversion,
and finally state bar admission regulation); H.R. 1228, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957)
(Congressman Rivers) (sought to deny appellate review of matters pertaining to public
schools). None of these bills was enacted into law. See also Elliott, Court-CurbingProposals
in Congress. 33 NOTRE DAME LAW. 597 (1958); McKay, Court, Congress, and
Reapportionment, 63 MICH. L. REV. 255 (1964); Talmadge, School Systems, Segregation,
and the Supreme Court, 6 MERCER L. REV. 189 (1955).
"3E.g., Hart, The Power of Congress to limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Merry, Scope of the Supreme Court's
Appellate Jurisdiction:Historical Basis, 47 MINN. L. REv. 53 (1962); Ratner, Congressional
Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157

(1960).
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jurisdiction is lacking, despite numerous Supreme Court comments
upon this relationship.14
The wording itself of this troublesome clause is open to various
interpretations, not all of which have been discussed by the
Supreme Court. One such interpretation would emphasize that
since article III clearly vests the judicial power of the United
States in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as
Congress may establish,'5 Congress may remove no judicial power
from the Supreme Court without disregarding this constitutional
mandate." This analysis further contends that the constitutional
founders provided that the judicial power should be exercised at
times as original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and that all
other exercises of judicial power were to be pursuant to appellate
jurisdiction. 7 Under this view Congress could allocate certain, types
of cases between the appellate and the original jurisdiction of the
Court,' perhaps because it deemed some cases to be of sufficient
import to merit original Supreme Court consideration. However,
Congress could never totally remove any of these cases from the
high court's jurisdiction. The only effect of excepting appellate
jurisdiction would be to allocate that subject matter to the original
jurisdiction of the Court. 9
This interpretation would appear to be entirely consistent with
the wording of article III and would give meaning to each section
pertaining to the judicial branch. However, the argument appears
" Note, Limitations on the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 20 U. PrTr. L.
REv. 99 (1958). See cases cited and discussed notes 40-63 infra and accompanying text.
"U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § I.

"The judicial power of the United States is actually "vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may . . . ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art.
IlI, § 1. Since and links one supreme court to the inferior federal courts, rather than or, a
reasonable interpretation might be that concurrent use of the judicial power between lower
federal courts and the highest court is contemplated by the Constitution. Thus, Congress, by
this analysis, may not take judicial power from the Supreme Court by legislative action and
give it solely to inferior federal courts. It appears established, however, that Congress may
create and destroy inferior federal courts and their jurisdiction without violating this
provision of article Ill. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850). See note 6 supra.
'" U.S. CoNsr. art. 11,
§ 2, cl. 2. See generally Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation ofpowers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 169-70 (1968)
(remarks of Mr. Van Alstyne) [hereinafter cited as Hearingson Separationof Powers]. Van
Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. I, 30-33.

,1Cases which the Constitution specified to be within the original jurisdiction of the Court
would, of course, not be subject to this manipulation.
"See note 17 supra.
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precluded in a large part by the venerable case of Marbury v.
Madison,21 where in striking down the original jurisdiction given
the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus, Chief Justice
Marshall clearly decided that the Constitution had determined what
jurisdiction would be original and what jurisdiction would be
appellate.2 ' If Congress could alter this constitutional distinction,
Marshall maintained, "the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the
constitution [would be] form without substance.

2

2

Marshall's

conclusion is, of course, subject to question, as the above argument
indicates. Moreover, it is ironic that in strengthening judicial power
through the vehicle of judicial review, Marshall would at the same
time read article I II in such a way as to foreclose an argument that
might be used to prevent evisceration of that judicial power by
congressional actionPss
A second interpretation of the exceptions and regulations clause
which has never been discussed by the Supreme Court concerns the
relation of appellate jurisdiction to the right of trial by jury.24 The
exceptions and regulations clause, as was much of article III, was
25
the result of work by the five-man Committee of Detail.
Immediately after providing for broad judicial power26 and wide
appellate jurisdiction as to law and fact z2 the Committee sought to
ensure that the common law right to a trial by jury would be
retained, although only in criminal cases.s This lack. of a jury
guarantee for all cases, coupled with the Supreme Court's appellate

"5

U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). See generally Hearings on Separation of Powers at 169

(remarks of Mr. Van Alstyne).
21Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 174-75 (1803). Another Marshall opinion,
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 394 (1821), affirms this statement in dicta.

2 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 174.
= See Van Alstyne, supra note 17, at 32. Although Marbury v. Madison purportedly

was overruled in part as recently as 1926 by Chief Justice Taft in Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, a reversal on this issue would be less likely, as it would go directly to the merits

of a semi-sacred piece of judicial handiwork.
21See Merry, supra note 13.

2The Committee of Detail was composed of John Rutledge (South Carolina), Edmund
Randolph (Virginia), Nathaniel Gorham (Massachusetts), Oliver Ellsworth (Connecticut),
and James Wilson (Pennsylvania). It met between July 26 and August 6, 1787. Merry, supra
note 13, at 57 & n.20.
§ I.
"U.S. CONST. art. i11,
2 Id. § 2, cls. 1-2.
"The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury.
...
Id.
cl.
3; see Merry, supra note 13, at 57-63.
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jurisdictional power to review a wide variety of cases-including
facts found in jury trials-was criticized by many of the convention
delegates.!9 However, countervailing the general desire to have juries
make final findings of fact rather than some far-off high court, was
the differing nature of the jury trial guarantee among the states3
Consequently, if any provision finalizing jury fact findings for cases
other than in the criminal area was to be included in article Ill, a
long and bitter debate as to the merit of such a provision for
various types of cases lay ahead of the delegates3 Thus, it has been
submitted that to avoid this debate the framers decided to leave to
Congress the problem of Supreme Court review of jury findings of
fact, and that consequently, the exceptions and regulations clause
applies only to Congress' power to limit or2 enlarge the ambit of
review of jury findings in non-criminal cases.1
This proposition may be supported by the writings of Alexander
Hamilton appearing as part of the Federalist Papers. Recognizing
the diversity of state practice regarding review of jury findings in
civil cases, Hamilton concluded that a blank check to juries and a
denial of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction as to jury findings
of fact might preclude such review in some cases where it might be
proper.Y To prevent such a result, Hamilton stressed that Congress
had been given the power by the exceptions and regulations clause
to modify, the Supreme Court's review of factual issues.3 5
Nevertheless, so to limit the meaning does not comport with the
actual language of the clause, for the phrase "with such
Merry, supra note 13, at 59.
3 For example, some states apparently utilized juries in equity and maritime cases, while
other states denied jury trials in these instances. 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 144 (1866) (remarks of
Richard Spaight, delegate from North Carolina). Alexander Hamilton suggested that jury
determinations of fact might not be proper in all instances when, in reference to certain
admiralty cases, he noted that judicial review of fact "might be essential to the preservation
of public peace." THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 490 (The New Am. Library 1961).
3' Merry, supra note 13, at 60.
Id. at 63.
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (The New Am. Library 1961).
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 488-90 (The New Am. Library 1961).
Id. at 490. Hamilton also stressed the importance of independence of the judicial branch
of government from the legislative branch. Id. No. 80, at 476. Such an argument indicates
that in Hamilton's mind the exceptions and regulations clause was not to be read as granting
plenary congressional power over Supreme Court appellate review of law. To interpret the
clause otherwise would deny a judicial power coextensive with legislative power, an idea
recognized as a "political axioni" by Hamilton. Id.
2
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Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make" appears to modify "appellate Jurisdiction," which has been
granted "both as to Law and Fact."3
Rather than embrace these possible interpretations of the

exceptions and regulations phrase, the Supreme Court has
consistently opted for interpretations which admit the plenary

power of Congress to determine what appellate jurisdiction the
Court shall have

7

An examination of Supreme Court decisions

reveals that three basic, occasionally interwoven threads of analysis
have been utilized in dealing with the power of Congress over the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
One train of thought, which has been entertained but rejected by
the Supreme Court, would require positive exceptions by Congress

divest the

to

Court

of its constitutionally-based

appellate

jurisdiction. This argument was first reported in the dissenting
opinion of Wiscart v. Dauchy.3 s In Wiscart, admiralty cases were

held to be civil cases under the Judiciary Act of 1789, and as such,
were found to be before the Court upon writ of error-a procedure

allowing review only as to questions of law. Justice Wilson, long an
advocate of judicial review of admiralty facts,3 9 was prompted to

dissent. Wilson argued that admiralty cases were not intended to be
civil cases, reviewable only by writ of error, but that since Congress
was silent on admiralty review, pursuant to the constitutional grant

of appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court had appellate
U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
In addition to ignoring the grant of appellate jurisdiction to law, it might be argued that
applying the phrase solely to appellate review of fact does not square eagily with the admitted
power of Congress to regulate the procedures through which Supreme Court jurisdiction is
perfected. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251-57 (1964). However, the exceptions and regulations clause need
not be the only constitutional authorization for Congress to regulate procedures of Supreme
Court review. Such procedures might also be sustained pursuant to the "necessary aqd
proper" clause or as implied powers to provide for the operation of the Court and the
constitutionally mandated judicial power. See Merry, sulira note 13, at 69. Recognition of
these additional constitutional authorizations for congressionally mandated procedure would
seem even more reasonable in light of the fact that original jurisdiction is also affected,
although the exceptions and regulations clause applies only to appellate jurisdiction. See 28
U.S.C.§ 1251 (1964).
" '[T]he governmental body most ready to assert the power of Congress to deprive the
Court of its appellate jurisdiction has been the Court itself." Comment, Congressional Power
Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: A Reappraisal, 22 N.Y.U. INTRA. L.
REV.

178, 183 (1967).

u 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796).
See generally Merry, supra note 13, at 63-68.
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jurisdiction, both as to law and fact.' The Wiscart majority was,
however, not persuaded by Wilson's view.
The idea that positive congressional exception was required to
divest the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction was again
rejected in a series of decisions by Chief Justice Marshall, as he
formulated a second interpretafion of the exceptions and
regulations clause. In United States v. More,4 Marshall laid the
framework for a "negative pregnant" doctrine of congressional
exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court. The question
involved in More was whether criminal cases could be reviewed by
the Supreme Court even though the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not
provide for criminal review. The Attorney General contended, as
did the dissent in Wiscart, that the Court could take jurisdiction,
arguing that appellate jurisdiction was conferred by the
Constitution and unless an exception had been specifically made by
Congress, the Court's jurisdiction was not circumscribed. 3
Marshall, however, refused to accept this view of the relationship of
Congress to the Court's appellate jurisdiction. He admitted that the
argument might have some weight if Congress had not seen fit to
confer any appellate jurisdiction upon the Court. However, because
Congress had described the jurisdiction of the Court in affirmative
terms, Marshall concluded all jurisdiction not positively conferred
must be implicitly prohibited.!
Marshall later reaffirmed his theory of implied exception 5 but
was careful to point out that the Constitution, not Congress,
conferred appellate jurisdiction upon the Court. 0 In later years,
13

U.S. (3 DalI.) at 325-26. Review of admiralty fact was recognized by Congress a few

years after Wiscart interpreted the Judiciary Act of 1789 as authorizing only review of law
by writ of error. Appeal was made the means of obtaining Supreme Court review in the Act
of March 3; '1803, sed. 2, 2 Stat. 244.
"See note 49 infra.
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159 (1805).
41Id. at 172-73.
" Id. at 173. Marshall analogized this theory to the jurisdictional amount then required to

allow Supreme Court review of a civil circuit court case. The requirement is positively stated,
but it is inferred that jurisdiction as to civil .cases less than this amount does not exist. Id.
11In Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307 (1810), Marshall again rejected
that analysis which would require positive congressional exception to divest the Court of
appellate jurisdiction. Again he conceded that this jurisdiction emanated from the
Constitution, id. at 314, but he implied congressibnal exceptions to the Court's appellate
jurisdiction by the affirmative actions of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and other congressional
affirmations of jurisdiction. Id. at 315.
"Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810).
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however, beginning under the auspices of Chief Justice Taney, the
constitutional foundation for the Court's appellate jurisdiction was

largely ignored and a third and final analysis of the exceptions
and regulations clause was entertained by the Supreme Court.
Unlike either the rejected interpretation which would have

required positive congressional action to remove appellate jurisdiction

or Marshall's

accepted

"negative

pregnant"

doctrine

which admitted implicit congressional exceptions, the third analysis,
accepted in dicta, apparently recognized no constitutional basis for
appellate jurisdiction.4 7 Thus, for example, in Barry v. Mercein,5
Taney remarked that "this court can exercise no appellate power

unless it is conferred by act of congress." 4
The distinction between Marshall's "negative pregnant"
This third analysis might actually be said to have begun with Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S.
(3 DalI.) 321 (1796). After Wilson's dissent suggested positive congressional action was
necessary to except cases from the Court's appellate review, Chief Justice Ellsworth, as was
customary practice at the time, filed a rebuttal opinion. Merry, supra note 13, at 67.
Ejlsworth laid the foundation for plenary congressional control of Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction when he remarked, "[l]f Congress has provided no rule to regulate our
proceedings, we cannot exercise an appellate jurisdiction; and if the rule is provided, we
cannot depart from it." Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 321, 327 (1796). To decide the
case Ellsworth needed to say no more than the latter phrase, so his pronouncement
indicating that appellate jurisdiction depended upon congressional authorization may be
disregarded as dictum. Ratner, supra note 13, at 174. Nonetheless, its implications were
certainly manifested in those later cases, following Marshall, which recognized congressional
action, not the Constitution, as the basis of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.
It should be noted that both Ellsworth and Wilson were members of the Constitutional
Convention's Committee on Detail, see note 27 supra, which authored the exceptions and
regulations clause. Therefore, to look to the legislative intent of this Committee appears to
result in a "Mexican Standoff," as both expressed totally different views of the meaning of
the clause in Wiscart.
'46 U.S. (5 How.) 103 (1847).
I at 120-21. Barry involved a petition for custody of a child pursuant to a writ of
Id.
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum. Id. at 1719. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat.
84, provided that decrees in civil actions by a circuit court could be reviewed by the Supreme
Court if the matter in dispute exceeded the sum of $2000. Since no money was involved in
the controversy, the matter in dispute could not be reviewed before the Supreme Court as a
civil action. Thus, the holding in Barry might well be limited to demanding the proper
jurisdictional amount in order to comply with the manner of appeal deemed appropriate by
Congress. At any rate, the point was not contested by the appellant in the case, nor were any
cases cited to support the dicta. Ratner, supra note 13, at 177-78.
The prerequisite of congressional action in order to cloak the Court with appellate
jurisdiction was further emphasized in later dicta. Thus, for example, in Daniels v. Railroad
Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 250 (1865), the Court remarked: "In order to create [appellate
jurisdiction] in any case, two things must concur: the Constitution must give the capacity to
take it, and an act of Congres§ must supply the requisite authority." Id. at 254 (emphasis
added).
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interpretation of the exceptions and regulations clause and that
interpretation which requires specific congressional approval for the
Court's exercise of appellate jurisdiction would be of no practical
consequence unless Congress had remained silent on the subject. 0
In such an instance Marshall's theory would have the Court
exercise full appellate jurisdiction whereas the latter interpretation
would deny any such exercise. Of course, this situation has never
existed, since the first Congress provided for the Court's appellate
jurisdiction with the Judiciary Act of 1789. Nonetheless, the
distinction between the two is theoretically important, in that
isolating the source of the Court's appellate review power may lead
to jurisdiction based either upon the benevolence of Congress or,
more firmly, upon the Constitution itself.
Despite their differences as to the relation between Congress and
appellate review by the Supreme Court, all three views of the Court
recognize potential plenary congressional power over appellate
jurisdiction, for all three views-including the rejected view of the
Wiscart dissent-recognize the power of Congress at least to make
positive exceptions to Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction.
However, it was not until Exparte McCardle5' that the Court was
faced with such a situation. Although all other Supreme Court
observations as to the power of Congress over appellate jurisdiction
may be dismissed as dicta or as involving questions of no
constitutional stature,5 2 McCardle will not be so easily explained
away.
Incarcerated as a result of the Reconstruction Acts following
the Civil War, McCardle petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to
the Circuit Court, pursuant to the Act of February 5, 1867. 53 Upon
denial of his petition McCardle appealed, under the same act, to
the Supreme Court. After determining that it did have
jurisdiction,54 the Court proceeded to hear arguments on the
merits-hich went to the constitutionality of the Reconstruction
Act under which McCardle was held. 55 After the case had been
heard on the merits but before a decision had been handed down,
m See text accompanying note 60 infra.
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
52 Ratner, supra note 13, at 173-74.
Act of Feb. 5, 1867, to Amend the Judiciary Act of 1789, 14 Stat. 385.
Exparte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1867).
"Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 508 (1868).
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Congress, fearing their Reconstruction scheme would be held

unconstitutional by the Court, repealed that portion of the Act of
February 5, 1867, which authorized appeal from Circuit Court
habeas corpus hearings to the Supreme Court. t

The Court for the first time was squarely confronted with a
positive congressional- exception to appellate jurisdiction. It
responded to the challenge by stating that "it is hardly possible to
imagine a plainer instance of positive exception . . . . Without

jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause." 57 After
recognizing Congress'

power to make positive exceptions

to

appellate jurisdiction, McCardle sought to explain away the broad
statements of decisions which indicated congressional action was a
prerequisite for appellate jurisdiction. Thus, -Marshall's implied
exception theory was accepted with the explanatory notation:
[lit was an almost necessary consequence that acts of Congress,
Act of March 27, 1868, ch. 34, 15 Stat. 44.
On January 6, 1868, Senator Williams reported an innocuous bill from the Senate
Committee on Finance which was designed to broaden the Supreme Court's jurisdiction in
certain revenue cases. S. REP. No. 213, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1868). The bill -passed the
Senate on March i1,1868, without discussion. 39 CONG. GLOBE 1807 (1868). The following
day Congressman Schenck gained the floor to introduce the bill in the House, assuring his
colleagues that -[t]here can be no possible objection to it." Id. at 1859. Once he had gained
the floor Schenck yielded to Congressman Wilson for an amendment, whereupon the
provision removing the Supreme Court's jurisdiction in McCardle was added. The bill, as
amended, was immediately passed without discussion. Id. at 1860. Two days later, the
opposition to the amended bill rose'to the surface in the House, blasting the procedural
shennanigans which facilitated ready passage of the bill. These remarks were chided for their
lateness by Schenck and other supporters of the bill who accused opponents of the measure
of being asleep when it was passed. Schenck, in support of the limitation placed on the
Court's jurisdiction, blasted the Supreme Court for usurping power and delving into political
matters. Id. at 1882-85.
The Senate passed the amended bill of March 12, the same day as the House passage.
Again there was no discussion; indeed, a motion to postpone consideration of the measure to
allow study of it was rejected. Id. at 1847. The bill was sent to the President for his
signature.
Although under impeachment charges, President Andrew Johnson left the bill unsigned for
the maximum period in hopes that the Court would act on the merits of McCardle before
the jurisdictional limitation could be passed. When the Court failed to act, Johnson vetoed
the bill on March 25, 1868, Id. at 2166.
The Sehate passed the bill over the President's veto on the following day, ignoring the
warnings of the opposition that the measure would set a dangerous precedent. Id. at 2115-28.
Within a day of the Senate, the House also overrode the Presidential veto after a short
discussion. Id. at 2166-70. See generally 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED
STATES HISTORY 455-97 (1932).
" 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 514. "
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providing for the exercise of jurisdiction, should come to be spoken
of as acts granting jurisdiction, and not as acts making exceptions
to the constitutional grant of it
Nevertheless, subsequent courts were either unaware of the
theoretical distinction which placed, appellate jurisdiction upon a
constitutional basis, felt such a concession unimportant, or
disagreed without comment on the principle '9 The Court, however,
recognized that this distinction was of no concern in McCardle, for
the exception under consideration was not a negative inference
based on an affirmative grant of appellate jurisdiction but rather a
positive exception made in explicit terms. 0 Nonetheless, to read
McCardle as authority for Congress to make any positive exception
to appellate jurisdiction insulates the decision from the turmoil of
the times when it was decided" and the Court's limitations on the
holding that quickly followed the case.
McCardle itself alluded to one such limitation when it asserted,
in dicta, that the entire habeas corpus jurisdiction of the Court had
not been removed by the Repeal Act of 1868, but only jurisdiction
to hear appeals from Circuit Court habeas decisions which had
previously been granted under the Act of 1867.62 Indeed, in Ex
parte Yerger,0 faced with a petitioner in substantially the same
circumstances as had been McCardle, the Supreme Court held that
the Repealing Act of 1868 affected only appellate habeas corpus
jurisdiction while it left untouched the jurisdiction of the Court to
issue an original habeas corpus petition pursuant to the Judiciary
Act of 1789. Consequently, McCardle could still have applied for
habeas corpus relief, if he had done so under the Judiciary Act of
1789. It is this crucial fact which places one of the largest limitations
upon the holding of the McCardle case, since in conjunction with
53

1d. at 513.
,See notes 49-51 supra and accompanying text, noting this misunderstanding of
Marshall's analysis which developed into a separate interpretation of the exceptions and
regulations clause.
6,See text accompanying note 57 supra.
" See Grinnell, Proposed Amendments to the Constitution: A Reply to Former Justice
Roberts, 35 A.B.A.J. 648, 650 (1949). McCardle is described as limited to "an exceptional
and extreme situation-an incident of the ruthless political struggle of a headstrong
congressional majority, thirsting for power which they abused when they took it." Id. See
also note 58 supra and accompanying text.
274 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 515.
-75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868).
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Yerger it may be seen that all the McCardle Court did was to

uphold a congressional exception of one procedure through which
relief could have been afforded McCardle."
Nevertheless, both Yerger and McCardle dealt with the writ of

habeas corpus, a procedure grounded in the Constitution

5

and thus

involving an area of appellate procedure which will receive special
consideration. Yerger goes to great lengths to explain the special
nature of the procedure and poses the unanswered query of whether
appellate jurisdiction by habeas corpus extends to all cases of

confinement by the authority of the United States-subject to no
exceptions made by Congress. 66 Recognizing, however, the

limitation on habeas relief set forth in McCardle, the Yerger court
looked to the particular act that limited jurisdiction in that case
and the "peculiar" circumstances surrounding it.67 Since legislation
such as the Repeal Act of 1868 was "unusual and hardly to be
justified except upon some imperious public exigency," the Court

did not hesitate to limit the effect of McCardle to appeals taken
under the act of 1867.!8

The bounds of the McCardle holding were further mapped in
United States v. Klein. 9 Pursuant to a Presidential pardon for
disloyalty," Klein, the administrator of the pardoned's estate,

brought suit in the Court of Claims to recover the confiscated

" Ratner, supra note 13, at 180. See also Wall Street Journal, May 27, 1968, editorial. The
point was raised repeatedly at the recent hearings of the Senate Judiciary's Subcommittee on
Separation of Powers. Hearings on Separation of Powers at 12 (remarks of Mr. Abraham);
123 (remarks of Mr. Pritchett); 168-69 (remarks of Mr. Van Alstyne). Contra, Hearings on
Separation of Powers at 16-17 (remarks of Mr. Gunther); 22-24, 132-33, 138, 196 (remarks
of Senator Ervin); 97 (remarks of Mr. Kurland).
' U.S. CorNsT. art. i, § .9, cl. 2. The argument has been made that this section of the
Constitution guarantees that some federal court will sit to determine the constitutional
claims of aggrieved individuals. Hart, supra note 13, at 1397-1401. If this argument is valid,
and that section of Dirksen's bill which denies federal court jurisdiction to review state court
determinations of obscenity is interpreted to include a denial of habeas corpus jurisdiction, it
would seem to follow that this denial would violate the habeas corpus guarantee of article 1,
section 9 of the Constitution. Cf Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393
U.S. 233, 243-44 n.6 (1968) (concurring opinion of Harlan, J.)
" 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 99.
ld. at 103.
"75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 103-05.
6 80 U.S. (13 Wail.) 128 (1871).
7 Proclamation of Dec. 8, 1963, 13 Stat. 737 (1863) (Abraham Lincoln).
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property of the deceased.7' The Court of Claims granted recovery,

whereupon the United States appealed to, the Supreme Court for
dismissal. While the case was pending, Congress passed a bill

providing, in essence, that the Supreme Court should have no
jurisdiction to allow those receiving executive pardon for acts of

disloyalty to recover a judgment against the United States on a
claim of confiscation and that any pardon accepted was to be
conclusive proof as to guilt for the acts pardoned. Noting that
"Congress had inadvertently passed the limit which separates the
legislative from the judicial power,"7 3 the Supreme Court held the

act unconstitutional.74 The end which Congress had sought to
achieve by removing appellate jurisdiction was to limit the effect of
Presidential pardons,75 as the Court had adjudged that effect to
be. 76 Thus, Congress was seeking to overrule what the Court

conceived as its duty in protecting the executive power under the
Constitution, and the exceptions and regulations power would not
give effect to the attempt.
The essential question is whether the exceptions and regulations
clause was intended to be a limitation on the judiciary as part
of the system of checks and balances set up under the Constitution. Those who choose so to read the clause find support
from the interpretations of the Supreme Court as expressed in

language from Wiscart to the present,77 but a close examination of
71This suit was authorized by the Act of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 820, in conjunction with
the Act of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. 589.
n Act of July 12, 1870, 16 Stat. 235. The Court characterized the act as providing "that
an acceptance of a pardon, without disclaimer, shall be conclusive evidence of the acts
pardoned, but shall be null and void as evidence of the rights conferred by it." United States
v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 144.
3 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147.
7,"[T]he language of the proviso shows plainly that it does not intend to withhold
appellate jurisdiction except as a means to an end." Id. at 145. The Court observed that the
"end" which was contemplated by the statute involved in Klein infringed on the Presidential
pardoning power granted by article II, section 2 of the Constitution. Thus the doctrine of
separation of powers had been violated twice, once by the legislative branch's effort to
prescribe a rule for the judiciary, see note 76 infra and accompanying text, and secondly by
the legislative effort to change the executive branch's power to pardon. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at
147-48.
's U.S. CONsT. art. 11, § 2, cl.
1.See note 76 infra.
7-80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145;see United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869).
n E.g., Hearings on Separation of Powers, 22-23, 133 (remarks of Senator Ervin). See
cases cited notes 40-63 supra and in accompanying text.
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these cases indicates that such sweeping possibilities of limitation
may not in fact exist. Indeed, since Congress has never sought to
exercise plenary removal power over the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, every Court statement supporting such a
position may be limited by the fact that such a statement was
really unnecessary to the outcome of the case7
Moreover, if the phrase were actually intended to be a check on
the use of judicial power, this intention could have been made
clearer. If plenary control were intended, rather than granting the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction for a particular group of cases
and then providing for "appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and
Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make," 7 it is reasonable to assume that the drafters
might have agreed on a clause providing that appellate jurisdiction
"shall be exercised in such manner as the legislature shall direct."
However, precisely such a clause, which would plainly have
subjected appellate jurisdiction to legislative direction, was
defeated by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention!, It
appears not unreasonable to read the defeat of this clause as one
si.,"
that legislative manipulation of appellate jurisdiction was not
intended by the founders as a check on the judiciary.
Furthermore, the words "exception" and "regulation" imply a
residuary from which to except and which to regulate 1 The choice
of these words, coupled with the rejection of a clause which would
clearly vest the legislature with plenary power over appellate
jurisdiction, indicates, at the least, an intent on the part of the
framers not to allow complete congressional control of appellate
jurisdiction. Moreover, in order to give this intent meaning, it
would appear that interpretation of this clause might mean that in
no issue over which the Supreme Court has been given appellate
jurisdiction may ultimate review by the Court be denied by
congressional action8 2 Thus, the exceptions and regulations clause
14Ratner, supra note 13, at 173-74; Hearings on Separation of Powers, 201 (remarks of
Mr. Van Alstyne).
" U.S. CONST. art. 111,
§ 2, cl.2.

"2

M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 425 (1911);

Ratner, supra note 13, at 172.
, Ratner, supra note 13, at 168-70.
Hart, supra note 13, at 1364-65. Consequently, Congress could not, under this view of

the clause, remove appellate juisdiction to all but patent cases. To allow it to do so would
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of the Constitution may be read as authority for Congress to make
reasonable procedural regulations for the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Courtss but not as authority to exclude a class of
cases involving constitutional questions from Court review solely
because of subject matter." Such an interpretation, although flying
in the face of certain broad statemefits by the Supreme Court,"5 is
not precluded by the narrow holdings of the cases in which the
exceptions and regulations clause has been examined.
Furthermore, to read the troublesome clause in such a manner
as to deny Congress the power totally to remove a certain
constitutional question from the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court is consistent with another line of cases outlining the
purpose of the Court in the constitutional scheme. The Supreme
Court has long been recognized as the constitutional
implementation of the supremacy clause,s which means that the
be to allow "exceptions" and "regulations" to engulf the appellate jurisdiction upon which
they were intended to act.
See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
Hart, supra note 13, at 1372; Ratner, supra note 13, at 171-72.
E.g., The "Francis Wright," 105 U.S. 381, 385-86 (1881): "What [the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court] shall be, and to what extent [it] shall be exercised, [is],
and always [has] been, [the] proper [subject] of legislative control. Authority to limit the
jurisdiction necessarily carries with it authority to limit the use of the jurisdiction. Not only
may whole classes of cases be kept out of the jurisdiction altogether, 'but particular
classes of questions may be subjected to re-examination and review, while others are not."
The narrow holding of this decision affirmed Congress' power to limit Supreme Court
jurisdiction to review questions of admiralty fact. See notes 47-49 supra and accompanying
text.
g U.S. CONST. art. VI, cf. 2. This thought was expressed throughout THE FEDERALIST No.
22 (The New Am. Library 1961). See, e.g., page 150: "To avoid the confusion which would
unavoidably result from the contradictory decisions of a number of independent judicatories,
all nations have found it necessary to establish one court paramount to the rest, possessing a
general superintendence and authorized to settle and declare in the last resort a uniform rule
of civil justice." In THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245-46 (The New Am. Library 1961), James
Madison echoed a similar sentiment: "It is true that in controversies relating to the
boundary between the two jurisdictions [nation and state], the tribunal which is ultimately to
decide is to be established under the general government . .

.

.Some such tribunal is clearly

essential to prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact." Hamilton
further argued in THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 476 (The New Am. Library 1961), that "[i]f
there are such things as political axioms, the propriety of the judicial power of a government
being coextensive with its legislative may be ranked among the number. The mere necessity
of uniformity in the interpretation of the national laws decides the question. Thirteen
independent courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the same laws, is a
hydra in government from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed." See
also THE FEDERALIST Nos. 81-82 (Hamilton).
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essential function of the Court is to maintain the supremacy of
federal over state law and the priority of the Constitution
respecting bothY In Marbury v. Madison's Chief Justice Marshall
recognized that the particular duty of the judiciary was to maintain
the supremacy of the Constitution. 9 Nevertheless, Marshall was
addressing himself to the judiciary in general, not to the Supreme
Court in particular, and it was for Justice Story in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee" to wed this maxim with the need for uniformity
of constitutional decisions throughout the country." Despite
Marshall's interpretation of the exceptions and regulations clause in
which he recognized that certain appellate jurisdiction could be
removed from the Supreme Court's appellate purview,9 the Chief
Justice was not faced with a situation in which the Court was being
denied every opportunity to decide an issue involving a
constitutional guarantee. In fact, in Cohens v. Virginia9 3 Marshall
indicated if such were the situation before the Court he might well
modify his interpretation of congressional power over the Court's
jurisdiction.94 Some years later, Chief Justice Taney, having
previously conceded Congress sweeping powers over the exercise of
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, 5 tempered his stand. In
Ableman v. Booth96 Taney upheld the power of the Supreme Court
to review a state court's issuance of habeas corpus relief to persons
in federal custody. In dicta Taney concluded that the appellate
power given the Supreme Court was designed to insure the
supremacy of the national government and the uniformity of its
Constitution and laws 7
5 Ratner, supranote 13, at 166.
5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
I8
d. at 177. See notes 17-25 supra and accompanying text questioning Marshall's
constitutional interpretation as to the'law he declared unconstitutional.
9014 U.S. (I Wheat) 304 (1816).
'1 Id. at 348. To harmonize varying interpretations of the laws and treaties of the United
States, as well as the Constitution, the appellate jurisdiction of one Supreme Court was "the
only adequate remedy for such evils." Id.
11Cases cited notes 42-46 supra and accompanying text.
1 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
14Id. at 415-18. Upholding the Court's authority to review a state court's interpretation of
federal statute, Marshall recognized: "[Tihe necessity of uniformity, as well as correctness in
expounding the constitution and laws of the United States, would itself suggest the propriety
of vesting in some single tribunal the power ot deciding, in the last resort, all cases in which
they are involved." Id. at 416.
See notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text.
H 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).
Id. at 517-18.
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Although Martin, Cohens, and Ableman all merely upheld the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction under section 25 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789, dicta in the opinions indicate a possible constitutional
basis for their results. 98 These cases involved the Court's
jurisdiction over state court interpretations of the Constitution,
laws, and treaties of the United States, but the thrust of the logic
used in their resolution is certainly applicable to any attempt to
deny appellate review of lower federal court interpretations of these
same documents. The opinions reason that it is one Supreme Court
that is contemplated by the Constitution,99 and to leave final
interpretations to many lesser federal or state judicial bodies is to
create multiple supreme courts, where basic federal guarantees
become one thing in one jurisdiction and another thing in
another-a result which does indeed seem repugnant to a
government bottomed on one Constitution.1'0 Thus, Martin, Cohens
and Ableman are very significant in eviscerating other dicta
regarding the power of Congress to deny appellate review.
To date, a resolution of the conflicting language in cases such as
McCardle and Ableman has been unnecessary, for Congress has
never sought to exclude one constitutional issue from the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Since the Judiciary Act of 1789
the Supreme Court has essentially exercised authority to review
every issue arising under the Constitution. Even in McCardle,
ultimate review of the rights involved could have been had by
another procedure. 0 ' In Klein, the one case where it may be said
" Ratner, supra note 13, at 167. This adumbrated constitutional basis would be the
supremacy clause. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
" U.S. CONsT. art. III, § I (emphasis added).

'0 In Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855), the Supreme Court further
emphasized the constitutionally-based nature of Court review. The Court noted that its
functions as determined by the framers of the Constitution included appellate review to
re-examine the merits of decisions by lower tribunals, to secure the privileges and immunities
of citizens according to the Constitution, art. IV, § 2, cl.1,and to assure that the
Constitution and federal laws and treaties would be the supreme law of the land. Id. at 35455. See also Ferris v. Coover, I I Cal. 175, 179 (i858).
"I See notes 62-64 supra and accompanying text. Indeed, the viability of McCardle has
been doubted as recently as 1962 by at least one member of the Supreme Court. In Glidden

Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), Justice Douglas remarked that "(tihere is a serious

question whether the McCardle case could command a majority view today." 1d. at 605 n.I I
(dissenting opinion). Douglas' dictum is considerably undercut, however, by Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 109 (1968) (concurring opinion), where, citing McCardle, Douglas remarked
that "fa]s respects our appellate jurisdiction, Congress may largely fashion it as Congress
desires ....
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that Congress attempted to deny appellate jurisdiction entirely as to
one type of subject matter, the Court found congressional action
violative of the Constitution. In light of past practices, the purpose
of the Supreme Court as it relates to the supremacy clause, the
holding in Klein, and other limitations placed on McCardle, it appears reasonable to expect that any congressional action pursuant to
the exceptions and regulations clause must be designed only to regulate, or except, certain procedures to which parties must turn in
order to bring their constitutional grievances before the Supreme
Court through its appellate jurisdiction.
THE DIRKSEN BILL

Before examining the development of the respective roles of the
Supreme Court, lower federal courts, state courts, and juries in
determining obscenity, mention should be made of several other
lines of constitutional analysis which raise questions about the
validity of the Dirksen bill's effort to curtail Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction in obscenity cases.
In United States v. Jackson'02 the Supreme Court held that the
punishment provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act 10 3 was an unconstitutional impairment of the right to a jury trial in that it forced
the defendant to subject himself to the risk of capital punishment
as the price for asserting the right to trial by jury.' Although
the case may be limited to situations involving the risk of death
as the price for asserting a jury trial, the logic of Jackson would
appear to extend to any statutory provision which places an added burden upon a defendant seeking a trial by jury."0 5 In the
Dirksen bill, a defendant under obscenity charges would face the
choice of either exercising his sixth amendment right to a jury
trial-without the safeguards inherent in judicial review of the jury
390 U.S. 570 (1967).
18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1964).
'0 The statute provided for the death penalty "if the. . . jury shall so recommend." If the
defendant waived his right to be tried by a jury he would be assured that he would not be
executed, but if the defendant sought to assert this right he was forced to subject himself to
the possibility of capital punishment. Thus the statute discouraged the defendant from
exercising his fifth amendment right to plead "not guilty" and also his sixth amendment
right to demand a jury trial. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1967).
"IId. at 592 (White, J., dissenting). The majority opinion is careful to speak of the death
penalty as the burden upon the right to trial by jury which makes the procedure
unconstitutional, but nowhere does the Court specify this limitation.
10
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decision-or foregoing the trial by jury in order to be assured that
his case might be reviewed by a higher court. The irony of such a
result is manifested in the fact that few defendants seek jury trials
of obscenity charges. 10c Nevertheless, if on its face a statute provides for a greater burden to attach to a trial by jury, such a
statute may be unconstitutional under the reasoning of Jackson,
since it "chills" a defendant's right to a jury trial. However, this
possible defect would be curable by amending the Dirksen bill to
allow only jury trials on federal obscenity charges, thus removing
the inequity which may fall within Jackson. Since there is no
constitutional right to waive a jury trial, 07 by removing the
possibility of waiver by a defendant the Dirksen bill would at least
foreclose a disparity-of-treatment argument based on Jackson.
But other disparity-of-treatment arguments, based on the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment as applied to the
federal government through the fifth amendment's due process
clause,10 s preserve a constitutional attack on bills such as Dirksen's
without reaching the issue of the relative role of judge and juror in
obscenity cases.109 Assuming that Congress does have the power to
remove the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, the equal
protection clause guarantees that the exercise of this power must be
rationally connected to a legitimate legislative purpose."' In the
case of the Dirksen bill, there is a question as to what. legitimate
legislative purpose is served by a denial of Supreme Court review of
state court or federal jury determinations on obscenity. If the
legislative purpose is to prevent the Supreme Court from applying
first amendment standards to certain materials, it may be doubted
that this is a legitimate goal. Persons tried for obscenity law
violations might receive a lesser degree of first amendment
protection than those facing charges of unlawful assembly,
' See. e.g., Bromberg, Five Tests for Obscenity, 41 CHI. B. RECORD 416, 418 (1960). But
cf. Lockhart and McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional

Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 36 & n.174 (1960) (one reason prompting an expanded venue
for federal obscenity violations was "liberal" juries).
'o Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
'' Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
"eDirksen's bill directly affects the relative roles of judge and juror only in federal
obscenity trials. See notes 3-5 supra and accompanying text.
11E.g., Morey v. Dowd, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S.
483 (1955); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
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incitement to riot, libel, and other areas closely connected with first
amendment freedoms which would continue to receive the
protection of Supreme Court review."' To protect against this
unequal treatment of those claiming violations of their first
amendment rights, perhaps Congress would have to provide that all
first amendment claims should be tried by a federal jury or a state
court without judicial review by the Supreme Court.
However, even assuming such a result to be politically feasible,
the equal protection argument would still not be answered. The
question would then become what the legitimate purpose is in
denying Supreme Court review of first amendment claims since
claimants seeking to assert other constitutional protections need not
rely solely on a jury trial or a state court determination without
Supreme Court review. The argument continues to expand as the
protection of additional rights is placed solely within the power of
the jury or of each state. Essentially, the question is whether the
piecemeal denial of the ability to present certain constitutional
claims before the Supreme Court may be a denial of equal
2
protection under the fifth amendment."
The complete denial of the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction would not appear to violate this interpretation of the
equal protection clause since all constitutional claims would be
treated equally. On the other hand, although complete denial of
apliellate jurisdiction would not deny equal protection in this sense,
another facet of equal protection may be denied. If constitutional
rights are to be finally determined by a jury or by a state court
there is no actual equal protection under the law. Federal rights
would become dependent on the place where that right was
asserted, and without Supreme Court review to establish a national
standard to resolve conflicting lower court interpretations and jury
results, the idea of a national Constitution guaranteeing national
rights would be totally undercut." 3
Obscenity cases provide an excellent example of how the locale
of a prosecution may determine a defendant's first amendment
rights. For example, before the Supreme Court reviewed the
obscenity prosecution of the book Fanny Hill,"4 the Massachusetts
' See cases cited notes 166-68 infra and accompanying text.
"'

2
"'

See generally Hearings on Separation of Powers, 170-71 (remarks of Mr. Van Alstyne).
Id. at 171.
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
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Supreme Judicial Court had concluded that the work was
obscene,"5 while in neighboring New York the Court of Appeals
had found the book protected by the first amendment." '
Furthermore, Congress apparently was recognizing this
geographical variance in 1958 when it passed an expanded venue
measure which authorized the prosecution of a mailer of obscene
material not only at the place of deposit, but also at any place
through which the material was mailed or at the place of receipt.",
Thus, areas of more "sophisticated" courts and jurors could be
avoided in an effort to obtain a higher rate of federal convictions
for the mailing of obscene matter."'
In certain respects the Supreme Court has indicated that what
constitutes obscenity may be a varying standard. Dissemination of
certain materials to children may be prohibited by carefully drawn
obscenity statutes which do not prevent distribution of the same
materials to adults.' Furthermore, the manner in which a work is
advertised may either extend material beyond the borderline of
obscenity or assure its protection.'2 However, despite these holdings
the Court has not yet accepted the notion that the standards should
vary with the place of prosecution, 2' and unless the Court would

I'Attorney

Gen. v. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of

Pleasure," 349 Mass. 69, 206 N.E.2d 403 (1965).
"ILarkin v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 14 N.Y.2d 399, 200 N.E.2d 760, 252 N.Y.S.2d 71

(1964).
"I Prior to this expansion, prosecution for the mailing of obscene matter had been limited

to the place of deposit. United States v. Ross, 205 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1953). In 1958 the
general federal obscenity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964), was amended to strike the

provision penalizing "[w]hoever knowingly deposits for mailing or delivery, anything . ..
[obscene]" and to substitute a provision penalizing "[w]hoever knowingly uses the mails for

the mailing, carriage in the mails, or delivery of anything [obscene]." 72 Stat. 962 (1958).
The purpose of this amendment was to make the use of the mails for the dissemination of

obscene material a continuing offense from the time and place of deposit, throughout transit,
to the time and place of delivery. The constitutionality of this expanded venue provision was
upheld in Reed Enterprises v. Clark, 278 F. Supp. 372 (1967) (three-judge district court),

affd per curiam, 390 U.S. 457 (1968).
"l The Post Office and Justice Departments supported the measure. See generally
Lockhart and McClure, supra note 106.
"I Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
121Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). See also Redrup v. New York, 386
U.S. 767 (1967).
12 Such a variation has, however, been proposed by some justices. Justice Harlan would
allow a variation of state results on obscenity-subject to Supreme Court review. See note

143 infra and accompanying text. In Jacobeiis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964), Justices

Warren and Clark accepted local community standards as a valid element in determining
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adopt a geographic variation test to determine obscenity, the
fluctuation of first amendment rights based on the place of
prosecution might be precluded as violative of equal protection.
It is arguable, therefore, that the Dirksen bill might be found
violative of the Constitution without an examination of what the
Court has assumed to be its duty to protect first amendment claims
in obscenity convictions via judicial review. Like the supremacy
clause, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, as
read into the fifth amendment's due process provision, may temper
the exceptions and regulations power given Congress under article
III. Both provisions may demand that some reasonable procedural
path be left open to obtain Supreme Court review of all
constitutional claims. Reliance upon such an argument, however,
assumes that the exceptions and regulations clause was not intended
as a congressional check on the Supreme Court. If the clause were
indeed designed to allow Congress to combat a line of Supreme
Court holdings on matters of fact or law, its exercise in this
manner as to obscenity decisions could hardly be labeled
"invidious" and violative of equal protection.122 Nonetheless, to
accept the clause as a blank check for Congress to limit, reverse or
ignore Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution would
seem to ignore the limitations adumbrated in Klein.
It is likely that legislation designed to remove a particular type
of' case or constitutional issue from the ambit of Supreme Court
review will prompt an investigation by the Court into the scope of
review it has exercised in the past regarding the subject of such
legislation. Just as Klein dedlt with an attempt to overrule the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Presidential pardoning power
under article 11,123 so might the Dirksen bill be an attempt to
overrule the Court's interpretation of the relationship of the first
amendment to obscerity. Consequently, if passed and tested before
the Court, the bill would likely precipitate a decision defining the
role of Supreme Court review in obscenity matters.
Characteristic with their obscenity decisions, the Court has
what is obscenity. This element of the test for obscenity remains in doubt. Jacobellis, a
highly fragmented decision which evoked seven separate opinions by the Court, dealt in part,
and inconclusively, with the issue of community standards. See note 138-39 and

accompanying text.
1 See generally Hearings on Separation of Powers, 171 (remarks of Mr. Van Alstyne).
'2

See note 76 supra and accdmpanying text.
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struggled, to no avail, to develop a clear understanding of its role
in reviewing lower court and jury findings. Since its landmark
decision in Roth v. United States,' the Court has periodically
reviewed obscenity convictions from lower courts, often remarking
on both its role and the role of the jury in an obscenity case.' In
enunciating the now classic Roth test of obscenity- "whether to
the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
prurient interest""'-the Court indicated that a sizeable role in
determining the issue of obscenity was to be left to the jury. The
Roth decision stamped approval on the lower court's jury
instructions as to the test for obscenity, which provided in part:
[Y]ou [the jury] determine [the questioned material's] impact upon
the average person in the community . . . . You judge the
circulars, pictures and publications which have been put in evidence
by present-day standards of the community . . . . In this case,
ladies and gentlemen of- the jury, you and you alone are the
exclusive judges of what the common conscience of the community
is, and in determining that conscience you are to consider the
community as a whole, young and old, educated and uneducated,
the religious and the irreligious- men, women and children.'"
If, however, one thing is certain about obscenity standards as they
have evolved since Roth, it is that a full retreat from this position
has been sounded.' m
The attacks on the pre-eminence accorded the jury in Roth were
not long in coming. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Roth and
concurring in the companion state obscenity case of Alberts v.
California, rejected the majority's implication that obscenity was a
2

354 U.S. 476 (1957).

The Dirksen bill sought to remove Court review of both federal jury findings and state
court determinations of obscenity. The remaining portion of this comment will emphasize
'

removal of the appellate jurisdiction to review jury determinations, examining in particular
the respective roles of the jury and the Supreme Court in defining obscenity.
'2354 U.S. at 489.
227 Id. at 490 (emphasis added). Recognizing the prospect of criticism that jury
determinations would declare the same material obscene in one locality and protected by the

first amendment in another, the Court responded by noting that "different juries may reach
different results under any criminal statute. That is one of the conseqpences we accept under
our jury system." Id. at 492 n.30. However, it is doubtful that the Court will now consider
obscenity convictions the same as convictions under "any criminal statute." See textual
paragraph infra accompanying notes 165-171.
I2 See notes 138-142 infra and accompanying text.
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question of fact. He preferred to label the determination of the
issue of obscenity "a question of constitutional judgment of the

most sensitive and delicate kind," noting that each suppression of
allegedly pornographic material raised individual constitutional
problems "in which a reviewing court must determine for itself

whether the attacked expression is suppressable within
constitutional standards.'

29

Roth had laid down an ambiguous test of obscenity. 3 ' As this
test was applied it was redefined until three elements were isolated
which were said to coalesce in obscene matter.3 1 In Memoirs v.
Massachusetts 32 this reworked Roth test was promulgated,

requiring that to find obscenity the dominant theme of the material
must appeal to the prurient interest in sex, the material must be
patently offensive to contemporary community standards, and the

work in question must be utterly without redeeming social value.z3
Although arguably as vague as Roth and subject to many

perplexing questions, this standard, at least as applied by the Court,
may be said to reach only "hard core" pornography,' assuming
12 354 U.S. at 497, 498 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). "IT]he
constitutional problem in the last analysis becomes one of particularized judgments which
appellate courts must make for themselves." Id.
In Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959), Harlan reiterated his demand
for individual case-by-case judicial examination of allegedly obscene material. This time his
effort was joined by the concurrence of two of Roth's majority, Justices Frankfurter and
Whittaker, who apparently had begun to doubt the assertions of jury expertise they assumed
without question in Roth.
J See text accompanying note 126 supra.
"' E.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (socially redeeming value); Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (patently offensive to contemporary community standards);
Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962) (patently offensive to contemporary
community standards).
383 U.S. 413 (1966).
SId. at 418.
2 Cf. Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 770-71 (1967). See generally Lockhart &

McClure, supra note 106, at 59-60. Hard core pornography was defined by Justice Stewart
in his dissenting opinion in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966): "Such materials
include photographs, both still and motion picture, with no pretense of artistic value,
graphically depicting acts of sexual intercourse, including various acts of sodomy and
sadism, and sometimes involving several participants in scenes of orgy-like character. They
also include strips of drawings in comic-book format grossly depicting similar activities in an
exaggerated fashion. There are, in addition, pamphlets and booklets, sometimes with
photographic illustrations, verbally describing such activities in a bizarre manner with no
attempt whatsoever to afford portrayals of character or situation and with no pretense to
literary value. All of this material . . . cannot conceivably be characterized as embodying
communication of ideas or artistic values inviolate under the First Amendment .. "
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that the defendant is guilty of no aggravating conduct.' s
One element of this tripartite test is "contemporary community
standards," an element dealt with extensively- although
inconclusively-in Jacobellis v. Ohio.3 n The problem of particular
concern with regard to community standards was whether this part
of the evolving three-part Roth test centered upon national or local
community standards. The resolution of this issue would apparently
define the role of the jury in determining obscenity since if local
standards must be affronted to constitute obscenity, it is certain
that the jury's role would be considerably enhanced. The jurors'
judgment of the standards of their community could be expected to
stand strong against the judgment of a single judge and, even more
likely, be superior to that of the Supreme Court, a group having no
knowledge of one particular community's standards. On the other
hand, if national standards were to be the guide, no local jury
could claim special knowledge. Jacobellis, nevertheless, shed no
light as to the meaning of "contemporary community standards,"
3
as the Court was divided evenly (two-two) on the issue. 1
Although failing to define contemporary community standards,
Jacobellis did sound the death knell for Roth's broad deference to
jury decisions. Without mention of his Roth opinion, Justice
Brennan reversed field from the broad authority he had earlier
accorded the jury in obscenity cases.' 31 He called for national
3
"

See text accompanying notes 119-20supraand notes 181-83 infra.
378 U.S. 184 (1964).

,=Of the four judges addressing themselves to the meaning of contemporary community
standards, Brennan and Goldberg opted for national standards emphasizing the need of one
test in which the limits of constitutional expression did not vary with state lines. Id. at 19295, 197-98. Warren and Clark emphasized that communities are different and should be
allowed different standards as to obscenity. In their view a national community standard was
indefinable. Id. at 200-03.
lu See notes 139-42 infra afid accompanying text. In a decision contemporary with Roth,
Brennan dissented in a case upholding New York's procedure for enjoining pendente lite the
sale of allegedly obscene books: "I believe the absence in this New York obscenity statute of
a right to jury trial is a fatal defect . .

.

. The jury represents a cross-section of the

community and has a special aptitude for reflecting the view of the average person. Jury trial
of obscenity therefore provides a peculiarly competent application of the standard for judging
obscenity which, by its definition, calls for an appraisal of material according to the average
person's application of contemporary community standards. A statute which does not afford
the defendant, of right, a jury determination of obscenity falls short, in my view, of giving
proper effect to the standard fashioned as the necessary safeguard demanded by the freedoms
of speech and press for material which is not obscene." Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354
U.S. 436, 447-48 (1957). In United States v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled "I Am
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community standards, emphasizing, as Harlan had previously, 139
that to consider a jury's verdict on obscenity to be a conclusive

factual judgment was an appealing suggestion, but one that could
not be accepted without an "abnegation of judicial supervision...

inconsistent with our duty to uphold the constitutional
guarantees.'

140

Speaking for those members of the Court preferring

local community standards as an element of the modified Roth
test, Chief Justice Warren, another member of the Roth majority,
expressed views on the role of the jury closest to those in Roth, but

nevertheless admitted the necessity for some judicial review in order
to find "sufficient evidence" on.the record upon which a conviction

could be based.'

Thus, Jacobellisrepresents a major erosion of the

great leeway given juries by Roth to convict pursuant to proper

instructions. Taken in context with the subsequent summary
reversals of lower court obscenity convictions,4 2 it may be said with
confidence that a majority of the Court refuses entirely to trust
lower court applications of the three-part obscenity test.
It appears improbable that even those justices who contemplate

the more lenient standard of review, the so-called "sufficient
Curious-Yellow," 404 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1968), Chief Judge Lumbard, dissenting, relied
heavily on Brennan's opinion expressed in Kingsley Books. The Chief Judge, however, chose
to ignore Brennan's subsequent reversal on the role of the jury in his Jacobellis opinion.
' See note 129 supra.
'"378 U.S. at 187-88. Another member of the Roth majority had backed off from the
implications of that decision on the role of the jury in obscenity convictions. Justices
Frankfurter and Whittaker, two more of the six-man Roth majority, had already agreed with
Harlan's position on this subject in Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684
(1959). See note 129 supra.
M 378 U.S. at 203. He was joined in this view by another member of the Roth majority,
Justice Clark. The final member of the six-man Roth majority, Justice Burton, had been
replaced by Justice Stewart. Although Stewart was virtually silent on the duty of the Court
to review jury and lower court findings, one might draw the inference from his statement in
Jacobellis. "I know it when I see it," id. at 197, that he also felt a case-by-case review of the
material to be necessary to determine obscenity.
ill E.g., Schackman v. California, 388 U.S. 454 (1967); Mazes v. Ohio, 388 U.S. 453
(1967); A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 388 U.S. 452 (1967); Rosenbloom v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 450 (1967); Books, Inc. v. United States, 388 U.S. 449 (1967); Corinth
Publications, Inc. v. Wesberry, 388 U.S. 448 (1967); Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447
(1967); Avansino v. New York, 388 U.S. 446 (1967); Sheperd v. New York, 388 U.S. 444
(1967); Cobert v. New York, 388 U.S. 443 (1967); Ratner v. California, 388 U.S. 442
(1967); Friedman v. New York, 388 U.S. 441 (1967); Keney v. New York, 388 U.S. 440
(1967). Contra. Landau v. Fording, 388 U.S. 456 (1967). All these were per curiam decisions
without opinion, most of which cited Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967), as
authority for reversal.
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evidence" standard, would accept no judicial review as sufficient
protection for first amendment claims on obscenity cases-the
result contemplated by the Dirksen bill. Justice Harlan, who has
long adhered to case-by-case review of the materials under attack,
has adopted a "middle view" in which he would apply a stricter de
novo standard of review to federal' obscenity convictions and a
more lenient "sufficient evidence" review to state cases.' However,
Harlan has long rejected the idea that obscenity is a question of
fact solely for a jury and, furthermore, has voted to overturn state
decisions when the material involved did not conform to his
14 4
definition of obscenity.
Of course, Congress has never passed a statute denying the
Supreme Court the jurisdiction to review certain findings on
obscenity, and perhaps such a statute would be acceptable-at least
to those judges who are loath to review the findings of juries or
state courts. However, in upholding such a statute the Court would
then be paving the way for'incorrectable infringements on the first
amendment rights of various individuals. For example, had
Dirksen's bill been the accepted law, the petitioner in Kingsley
Pictures Corp. v. Regents14 5 might have been denied the right of
Supreme Court review, since the state's denial of a license to show
its picture was confirmed by the highest court of New York.", Yet
iii Kingsley Pictures, the Supreme Court by a unanimous vote
declared the lower court decision violative of the petitioner's first
amendment rights. 14 7 A statute designed to deny the Court's
" This bifurcated standard was first laid down in Harlan's opinions in the Roth-Alberts
cases. It appears to be based in large part on Harlan's view of federalism in which obscenity
is primarily of concern to states and not the federal government. 354 U.S. at 505-06. But a
practical expedient also underlies Harlan's reasoning. As he noted in Interstate Circuit v.
Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1967), "the current approach has required us to spend an inordinate
amount of time in the absurd business of perusing and viewing the miserable stuff that pours
into the Court, mostly in state cases, all to no better end than second-guessing state judges."
Id. at 707. Consequently, Harlan would reduce this "inordinate amount of time" spent
reviewing obscenity materials by relaxing review as to state convictions.
M E.g., Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 702-08 (1959).
It Id.
"' Kingsley

Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 4 N.Y.2d 349, 151 N.E.2d 197, 175 N.Y.S.2d 39
(1958).
"7 Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959). In like manner such a
law would have removed the Court's jurisdiction in the per curiam decisions following Redrup
which reversed state court holdings. See note 179 infra and accompanying text. Thus what
the Court declared to be constitutionally protected free speech would have been "censored"
by state court convictions.
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jurisdiction to review jury findings on obscenity would essentially
change the test of obscenity that the Court has been attempting to
mold, consistent with their interpretation of the first amendment, to
a test that obscenity is what a jury says it may be. A statute
designed to deny the Court's jurisdiction to review state findings on
obscenity likewise creates various new standards according to what
the states say obscenity is. Congress would seem precluded from
redefining what the Court perceives as its first amendment
constitutional duty by manipulation of appellate jurisdiction."'
The justice most critical of the Court's review of lower court
findings would appear to be Justice Black, who along with Justice
Douglas considers all obscenity statutes and convictions as
violations of the first amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech
and press.'49 Justice Black first leveled his standard attack on
Supreme Court review of lower court obscenity convictions in
Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents.

0

Accusing his brother justices

of substituting their own judgments of morality for the judgments
of others, 5 ' he issued a ringing warning that "flf. . .this Nation
is to embark on the dangerous road of censorship, my belief is that
this Court is about the most inappropriate Supreme Board of
Censors that could be found."'' Black's criticisms of Supreme
Court review of obscenity convictions seem questionable, however,
for his real concern is with maximizing the protections of the first
amendment, not narrowing Court review' 53 Indeed, in his joint
dissent with Douglas in Roth, attacking the majority's test, it was
noted that "juries can censor, suppress, and punish what they don't
like, provided the matter relates to 'sexual impurity' .

community censorship in one of its worst forms."'

4

. .

. This is

Furthermore,

United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). See notes 73-76 supra and
accompanying text.
"I These are the only two justices to subscribe to such a view, but they have religiously
adhered to it since obscenity became a concern of the Court in Roth. It is questionable,
however, whether Black's counterpart Douglas agrees with his criticisms of Supreme Court
review. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 169 (1959) (Douglas, J. concurring). See text
accompanying notes 154 infra.
,.360U.S. 684 (1959).
18

'Id.
at 690-91.
"'See id. at 690. Black reiterated his stand in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 159

(1959), and Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 516-17 (1966).
l,Cf. Strong, The Persistent Doctrine of "'ConstitutionalFact," 46 N.C.L. REv. 223, 270
(1968).
M354 U.S. at 512.
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the term "Supreme Board of Censors" has a hollow ring to it. If
the Court were overturning jury or lower court acquittals of
obscenity violations, the charge would have more substance, but it
is only after some lower court action has resulted in a conviction
on obscenity charges, and thus "censorship," that the Court has
reviewed obscenity cases. A more realistic view is that instead of
denying the public access to certain works, the Court has "forced"
works on an unwilling locality. Until the Court actually reviews
and denies access to materials "approved" by virtue of lower court
acquittals, it is doubtful that it is actually performing what is
suggested by the term "Supreme Board of Censors." Its record in
obscenity review suggests the antithesis of censorship. 5
The competency of a jury to decide what constitutes obscenity
has been questioned in the obscenity decisions which have thus far
been handed down. One segment of the Court doubts the jury's
ability to determine what, should be .protected and what can be
constitutionally prohibited.' m Another view would accord the jury's
determination greater weight by reviewing findings in light of a
"sufficient evidence" test. 157 However, no Supreme Court justice
has yet suggested that jury determination as to the issue of
obscenity be finalized without review. Indeed, the theory closest to
the denial of all Supreme Court obscenity, the "Supreme Board of
Censors" theory, was argued by a justice who would strike down
all obscenity legislation as unconstitutional.'
155See, e.g., cases cited note 142 supra.
5- Of the Justices presently on the Court, this includes Justice Brennan and probably Justice
Stewart. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 629, 672 (1964) (opinions of Brennan, J. and Stewart,
J.). Justice Harlan expressed similar sentiments in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476

(1957). His views, however, are tempered by his view of federalism, as he would be quicker to
overrule a federal lower court than a state decision.
157Chief Justice Warren is the only Justice now sitting on the Court who has espoused this
position for all obscenity review. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). Justice Harlan
would, however, subscribe to such a "sufficient evidence" standard for review of state court
convictions. See note 143 supra.
15 This is, of course, Justice Black. See notes 149-52 supra and accompanying text. The
political wisdom of the suggested statute may well be doubted. Justice Harlan in Kingsley

Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959), while reiterating his belief that a case-bycase examination of material was constitutionally required, limited this demand when he said
such was the requirement short of holding all "'censorship" laws unconstitutional. If the

Court were to recognize that Congress might limit its appellate jurisdiction as suggested, a
desire to avoid puritanical jury and lower court 'censorship" via obscenity convictions
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If, however, obscenity is decided to be a question of "fact," it
would appear to follow that the jury would be the most competent
body to make the determination."' Furthermore, if the issue is one
of pure fact, the primary role of the Supreme Court would not be

diminished by denying judicial review of facts by means of the

exceptions and regulations power.1 60 However, the fact-law
distinction, often hazy, is never fuzzier than in the area of

obscenity.' 1 It may be argued that obscenity is basically a question
of law-a constitutional issue;'6 2 on the other hand, it may be

labeled a question of "constitutional fact" subject to review by the
Court since the determination of fact profoundly influences

constitutional rights.' Finally, obscenity may represent neither a
question of law nor a question of fact, but rather something in between--an application of the law to the facts.'

Selection of one of

these labels is not significant, however, as all allow the Court to
review jury and lower court findings.

The question is not resolved by conclusory labeling of an issue
as fact-and thus not subject to review-or as law-and thus

might conceivably lead to an overthrow of all obscenity statutes as violative of the first
amendment. This possibility is not precluded by Dirksen's bill-nor could it be under our
system of judicial interpretation of statutes and the Constitution.
"' For the strongest weight recently placed upon the jury's findings on obscenity, see
United States v. A Motion Picture Filni Entitled "I Am Curious- Yellow," 404 F.2d 196
(2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, C.J.. dissenting).
1" See generally Merry, supra note 13.
"IThis is evident from the divergent views taken by various Justices on the proper scope of
Supreme Court review of obscenity convictions. See notes 156-57 supra and accompanying
text.
"'See Lockhart and McClure, supra note 106; Comment, The Scope of Supreme Court
Review in Obscenity Cases, 1965 DUKE L.J. 596, 598.
3 Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity. 1960 S. CT. REV. I, 21. See
generally Strong, supra note 153. The doctrine enabling Court review of so-called "fact"
issues under the label "constitutional fact" was originated in order to allow judicial review
of the findings of administrative agencies. See generally St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v.
United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); Ohio Valley
Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920). The doctrine has been widely
criticized as applied to judicial review of the fact findings of these agencies. E.g., K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 29.09 at 535 (1959 ed.);
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 472-92 (4th ed.

W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE,
1960); Dickinson, Crowell v.

Benson: Judicial Review of Administrative Determination of Questions of -Constitutional
Fact,- 80 U. PA. L. REV. 1055 (1932). No such criticism has, however, followed the review
of "constitutional fact" in civil liberty cases. Strong, supra note 153, at 280.
1" 8 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 634, 635 (1961).
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subject to Supreme Court scrutiny. The problem is rather
essentially one of jury competency to reach a conclusion on an
issue. Regardless of the reverence held for juries, there are certain
areas in which their decisions must be based on highly
circumscribed evidence or, at least, subject to close trial judge and
appellate court review. For example, the competency of the jury to
determine whether or not a confession is voluntary has long been
suspect, and as such subject to careful judicial scrutiny.'65 The
reason is apparently based on a feeling that jurors might be unable
to grasp the subtle importance underlying certain constitutional
rights, such as the exclusion of a corroborated confession which,
although psychologically or physically coerced, appears to be
truthful. Another example closer to the problem at hand, is the
judicial willingness to review a first amendment claim more
completely than other constitutional questions. Consequently,
criminal convictions bearing on the issue of freedom of assembly 6'
or speech"6 7 have been carefully scrutinized. Furthermore, Court
review of fact in first amendment cases has been extended to civil
libel suits, 68 even though jury fact determinations have been
emphasized in this area because of the specific jury trial guarantee
in the seventh amendment.'69 Like the other areas surrounded by
"1

E.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), overthrew a New York procedure which

allowed the same jury to determine guilt of the crime confessed to as well as voluntariness of
the confession. Only after judicial acceptance of a confession was limited in 'Miranda and

Escobedo has judicial review actually been relaxed in this area. Strong, supra note 153, at
260.

"I6E.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963); Feiner v. New York, 340
U.S. 315, 316 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951).
"I One example would be contempt of Court or similar "obstructions"

to the

administration of justice, Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946); Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941); Strong, supra note 153, at 262-63. Another type review

touching on free speech woild be "incitement" charges. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242
(1937).
"
"'

E.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964).
U.S. CorsT. amend. VII. "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy

shall eXceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by
a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of common law." This extension of the Court's review of facts, and the potential
clash with the seventh amendment did not go without criticism by Justice Black. Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 171 (1967). Although Black criticized the Court for

"getting itself in the same quagmire in the field of libel in which it is now helplessly
struggling iri
the field of obscenity," id., his views on judicial review in this area are subject

to the same criticisms as his views on obscenity fact review. Like obscenity laws, Black
considers libel actions to be forbidden by the first amendment. His real concern is more
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first amendment protection, regulation of obscenity has enjoyed a
full measure of Supreme Court supervision. 170 The underlying
rationale for this review may be based, at least in part, upon a
feeling that the jury is incompetent to be given the final
determination as to the ambit of first amendment protection. Jury
members are likely to be subject to various local pressures and
community sentiment which they may be unable to ignore, partly
because they have less independence than a Supreme Court Justice
appointed for life, and partly because they are likely to be less
sensitive to basic values of freedom of expression which underlie
first amendment standards."'
A bill demanding the "sufficient evidence" standard of
obscenity review would appear to have a better chance of incurring
judicial favor than Dirksen's bill, which would deny Supreme
Court review entirely. Several members of the Court have
advocated a "sufficient evidence" standard, and it does allow for
some first amendment judicial protection in determining the issue
of obscenity. It is doubtful, however, that the "sufficient evidence"
scope of review would release the Court from the time-consuming
task of reviewing materials adjudged to be obscene by the court or
jury below. Once the power to review obscenity convictions is
recognized, it is difficult to imagine what guideline the term
sufficient evidence offers. If the Court is to continue to utilize the
three-pronged test that has evolved from Roth 172 in reviewing
allegedly obscene material, the failure of any one of these elements
will bring the questioned material within the protection of the first
amendment. Thus, unless the dominant theme of the material
appeals to the prurient interest in sex, unless the material is
patently offensive to contemporary community standards, and
unless the material is utterly without redeeming social value, the
work will not be declared obscene. 7 3 In applying this test, it is
likely broadening First amendment protections, not ending judicial review. See note 153 supra
and accompanying text.
E;
.g.. see cases cited note 142 supra.
Lockhart & McClure, supra note 106, at 119. "If freedom is to be preserved, neither
government censorship experts nor juries can be left to make the final effective decisions
restraining free expression. Their decisions must be subject to effective, independent review
. . . under the guidance of the Supreme Court." Id.
"7 See note 131 supra and accompanying text.
1 Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966). This is not to imply that the
obscenity of a particular work may not vary with the manner in which it is sold. See notes
121-22 supra and 181-83 infra and accompanying text.
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necessary that the Court closely review the record and the
materials,'7 4 at least to determine the dominant theme of the
material attacked, as well as to assure itself that the work is utterly
without redeeming social value. 7 s Particularly in light of the fact
that a sufficient evidence standard has not been accepted by most
members of the Court, such an imposition by Congress may violate
the principles enunciated in Klein, since such a bill would be an
effort by Congress to direct the Court to exercise its
constitutionally perceived duty in a particular manner. 76 If such a
lesser standard is imposed by Congress, it may weaken first
amendment protections which the Court has felt compelled to
provide.
CONCLUSION

Despite cases which indicate plenary congressional power to
limit Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, it is doubtful that the
Court will sustain a limitation which will deny its role in protecting
first amendment freedoms. Although justices have disagreed as to
the amount of Supreme Court review necessary in an obscenity
case, not one has yet suggested that no review would be a
permissible alternative. Congressional effort to foreclose such
review, if not aborted in the legislative process, therefore seems
highly subject to valid constitutional attack in the Court. However,
congressional frustration with obscenity standards is not altogether
unjustified. The Court has been slow to set firm standards, in an
area where sensitive and precise tools are demanded,'7 7 and has
instead relied extensively upon judicial review to prevent
I If the review contemplated by the sufficient evidence standard is merely a review of the
record below-not an examination of the questioned material-the general administrative
law standard would be satisfied. W. GELLHORN & C. Bmsi!. supra note 163. at 453. However.
judicial review in the first amendment and civil liberties areas of the law has generally been
accorded a higher standard than mere review of the record. Se notes 163. 165-71 and
accompanying text.
I's
See Comment, The Scope of Supreme Court Review in Obscenity Cases, 1965 DuKe
L.J. 596, 607. Thus, even if the expertise of the jury is recognized for determining community
standards-even local community standards-judicial review would still be necessary under
the present Court-developed definition of obscenity as to the remaining two elements of the
evolved Roth test.
'7,See notes 69-76 & 123 supra and accompanying text.
m NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513. 525

(1958).
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misapplication of the nebulous outlines it has supplied. When more
precise standards are developed, however, the need for extensive de

novo review will be less pressing, as lower courts should be better
able to apply the clearer mandates. 17 8 Perhaps such standards are
now being accepted. Redrup v. New York, " a per curiam decision

evidencing unusual unity for an obscenity decision, indicates that a
strict "hard core" definition will be given obscenity in the future. 1'0

Any other obscenity prosecution must be supported by certain
aggravating features which Redrup enumerates. Prosecution may be
based on materials sold to children-if pursuant to a statute

expressing a "specific and limited state concern for juveniles.'

'181

Furthermore, successful prosecution may be supported by the fact

that dissemination of the material is "in a manner so obtrusive as
to make it impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid exposure

to it."''

2

Finally, for sexually oriented material that is less than

"hard core,"

a conviction may be sustained by evidence of

"pandering" to fancies, desires or sexual weaknesses of the
public.'13 As these standards are molded and become set, the need
for Supreme Court review of obscenity cases will decrease, but by
the Court's own volition rather than by congressional
compulsion. 8 4 And unlike the contemplation of the Dirksen bill, the

possibility of Supreme Court review will keep lower court
"censorship" in check. By accepting the vital role of the Supreme

Court in protecting constitutional guarantees from legislative
encroachment, Congress can then concentrate on aiding the Court

in shaping the developing standards in the field of obscenity.

171

Cf Strong, supra note 153, at 249-61 (similar observation made relating to confession
cases, i.e., the clearer the standards, the less need for review).
17 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
IMCf.id.at 770-71.
" Id. at 769. See also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
1" 386 U.S. at 769. Thus the right to privacy must in effect be balanced against the first
amendment rights to speech and press.
"1 Id. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). "Pandering"
and invasion of
privacy may be so closely related as to be part of the same package.
11"Justice Fortas, dissenting in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 674 (1968), presaged
this demise of judicial review with the concurrent development of more certain standards. "If
this statute [New York statute designed to protect juveniles] were confined to the punishment
of pushers or panderers of vulgar literature I would not be so concerned by the Court's
failure to circumscribe state power by defining its limits in terms of the meaning of
'obscenity' in this field. The State's police power may, within very broad limits, protect
parents and their children from'public aggression of panderers and pushers."

